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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 56 SPRING 1982 NUMBER 3
INCOME IN RESPECT OF A DECEDENT
GILBERT P. VERBIT*
INTRODUCTION
From its inception in 1913, the individual income tax law has
provided that an individual's taxable year terminates upon his
death.1 After death, an individual's role as a taxpayer is assumed
by his estate, which in turn, is liable only for tax on income earned
by the estate.2 Such treatment of the estate poses no difficulty
where the decedent-taxpayer had reported income on an accrual
basis. In such a situation, all income is taxable when earned by
either the taxpayer or his estate. Most individual taxpayers, how-
ever, report their income on a cash basis. In this event, all income
may not be accounted for, and thus, may not be taxed. The reason
for this loophole is twofold: (1) the cash basis taxpayer will only be
taxed for income received during his lifetime; and (2) the tax-
payer's estate may only be taxed for income earned by the estate
after his death. Thus, income earned by the taxpayer but received
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; B.S., University of Pennsylvania,
1957; LL.B., Yale University, 1960.
I See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § HG(c), 38 Stat. 175 (current version at I.I.C. §
443(a)(2)).
2 I.R.C. § 641 (1979). This section provides that estates are liable for income tax in the
same manner as are individuals. Id. § 641(b). Thus, an estate is liable only on income earned
by the estate. See, e.g., Davidson v. United States, 149 F. Supp." 208, 211 (Ct. CL 1957).
Upon death, an individual ceases to be a taxable entity. Treas. Reg. § 1.443-1(a)(2) (1957).
The individual's estate immediately springs into existence and thereafter is treated as a
"separate" taxpayer. Herbert's Estate v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 756, 757 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944).
3 Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 941 (Ct. CL), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939 (1961); Bernard v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Rev. Rul. 454,
1920-2 C.B. 170; see Ferguson, Income and Deductions in Respect of Decedents and Re-
lated Problems, 25 TAx L. REv. 5, 6 (1969); Note, Sales Transactions and Income in Re-
spect of a Decedent, 3 GA. L. REv. 606, 607 (1969).
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by the taxpayer's estate is attributable to no one, and hence, is
taxable to no one. 4 The congressional response to this inequality
between cash and accrual basis taxpayers led to the development
of the concept of income in respect of a decedent (IRD), codified in
section 691 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).5 This Article will
explore the historical background of IRD and the problems it has
engendered, particularly with respect to capital sales transactions.
It will conclude with some suggestions for reform of the current
statutory scheme.
HISTORICAL PERSPEcTIVE
Discrimination against accrual basis taxpayers first was ad-
dressed by section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1934, which required
that all final individual tax returns be reported on the accrual
method.' This reform, however, created new hardships.7 The ac-
crual system caused the decedent's final tax return to recognize in-
come items which ordinarily would have been realized over an ex-
tended period of years." The bunching of income was particularly
4 See Klein, Tax Accounting: Coming to Grips With Income in Respect of a Decedent,
5 REv. TAx. NnivmuALs 303, 305-06 (1981). Consider the situation of a cash basis taxpayer
who, entitled to payments for services rendered, dies before receipt of the proceeds. These
wages are unrealized at the time of the taxpayer's death and, therefore, are not included as
gross income in the decedent's final tax return. In re Held, 3 B.T.A. 408, 408, acq. V-I C.B. 3
(1926). Similarly, the salary payment when realized would not be properly reportable on the
estate's income tax return because the proceeds do not represent earnings by the estate.
I.R.C. § 641 (1979).
1 Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 235 (current version at I.R.C. § 691(a) (1980)). Sec-
tion 691(a)(1) provides that "income in respect of a decedent" is to be included in the in-
come tax return of the estate, beneficiary, or other person entitled to receive the amount by
reason of the taxpayer's death. I.R.C. § 691(a)(1) (1980).
6 Rev. Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 680 (current version at I.R.C. § 691(a) (1980)).
Section 42 provided:
In the case of the death of a taxpayer there shall be included in computing net
income for the taxable period in which falls the date of his death, amounts ac-
crued up to the date of his death if not otherwise properly includible in respect of
such period or a prior period.
Id. The purpose of the legislation was to close a loophole through which slipped certain
income accrued to the cash basis decedent. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934),
reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 554, 572; S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934), reprinted
in 1939-2 C.B. 586, 608.
1 Section 42 brought its own inherent inequity in the form of bunching into a dece-
dent's last return substantial amounts of income which became instantly subject to tax rec-
ognition because of the taxpayer's death. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Ses. 89 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942),
reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 580.
1 See note 7 supra. For examples of the practical harshness resulting from the accrual
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burdensome in later years because of the effect of high wartime
surtaxes.' Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Estate of
Enright,10 broadly construed the "accrual" statute as manifesting a
congressional intention to "cover into income the assets of dece-
dents, earned during their life and unreported as income," regard-
less of the decedent's right to receive the item and the amount
thereof.1 Because of the "bunching" problem, as well as the ex-
pansive interpretation of the concept of accrual in Enright, public
criticism mounted and section 42 became a cause for congressional
concern.
In 1942, Congress abandoned accrual in favor of an entirely
new concept-income in respect of a decedent." Aware of the
method, see Helvering v. McGlue's Estate, 119 F.2d 167, 169-72 (4th Cir. 1941); First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Manning, 100 F. Supp. 892, 895-96 (D.N.J. 1951), afl'd, 196 F.2d 247
(3d Cir. 1952); Estate of Remington, 9 T.C. 99, 107 (1947); Estate of Ledyard, 44 B.T.A.
1056, 1065-66 (1941), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243
(2d Cir. 1944).
9 See Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1942). During the course of these hearings, Mr. Randolph
E. Paul, tax advisor to the federal government, stated:
Under present provisions income accrued to the date of a decedent's death must
be included in the return of his last income tax period. The "bunching up" of
income that may occur under this provision can work a severe hardship, as the
income of the decedent may in effect be artificially raised to a much higher surtax
bracket.
Id. (statement of Mr. Randolph E. Paul).
10 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
2 Id. at 644-45. The purpose of section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1934 was to equalize
the tax treatment of cash and accrual basis decedents. See note 6 and accompanying text
supra. In Helvering v. Estate of Enright, 312 U.S. 636 (1941), the United States Supreme
Court, relying on legislative intent, held that "items of partnership income properly ac-
crued" should be included as gross income in the decedents final, return. Id. at 642. Sug-
gesting that the term "accrued" had no fixed meaning, the Court went on to define it to
include "the value of the services rendered by the decedent, capable of approximate valua-
tion." Id. at 645. The Court's definition of the term "accrued" was broader than its contem-
porary usage in accounting practice, which did not recognize the existence of "accruals"
unless there had been a determination of the right to receive an amount payable. See Hol-
land, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 MICH. L. Rav. 149, 149-50 (1949). The
Court's expanded notion of "accrued" seemed to embrace, as decedent's gross income, items
which were properly estate assets. Thus, the result of Enright was to aggravate "pyramid-
ing" by taxing inchoate and conjectural income. Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 939
(Ct. C.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
12 Congress' response to the problems incurred under section 42 of the Revenue Act of
1934 was to remove the cash basis taxpayer's final return from the accrual system and to
invent a new category of income-the notion of "income in respect of a decedent." The
concept was introduced in the Revenue Act of 1942, see Rev. Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 126, 56
Stat. 798, 831-34 (1942) (current version at LR.C. § 691), and was intended
to reduce the income tax significance of death by treating items not properly taxa-
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Helvering Court's expansion of the accrual statute, Congress, in
amending the 1939 Code to include section 126, the forerunner of
section 691 of the 1954 Code, avoided equating its new concept
with accrual methods of accounting.13 Thus, the statute, which is
substantially the same today, provides simply that income items
not properly taxable to the decedent at the time of his death shall
be taxable to the decedent's successor in interest in the taxable
year in which the amount is received. 14 The decedent's successor in
interest is defined as his estate, distributee, legatee, or any person,
who by reason of the decedent's death, acquires the right to the
income.15
Substantial problems have arisen, however, because the stat-
ute does not define its subject, namely, whether or not an item is
"income in respect of a decedent."16 This has proven especially
ble to the decedent by the time of his death as income to its ultimate recipient "of
the same nature and to the same extent as such amounts would be income if the
decedent remained alive and received such amounts."
Ferguson, supra note 3, at 7 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, 83
(1942)); see S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504,
579 ("[tlhis provision is designed to place the [recipient of income in respect of a decedent]
... in the same position with respect to the nature of the income as the decedent
enjoyed").
Is Ferguson, supra note 3, at 9 & n.18; see S. RP'. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-05
(1942).
" The only substantive change in the 1954 Code was an expansion of the section's
scope so as to include items of income in respect of a prior decedent. See generally Klein,
supra note 4, at 307.
15 I.R.C. § 691(a)(1)(A), (B), (C).
1 Section 691(a)(1) does not provide a definition of income in respect of a decedent,
but describes the tax consequences to the decedent's successor in interest-
The amount of all items of gross income in respect of a decedent which are not
properly includible in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date of his
death or a prior period ... shall be included in the gross income, for the taxable
year when received, of [the recipient].
I.R.C. § 691(a)(1). Legislative attempts to fix the meaning of IRD have failed of enactment.
The Advisory Group on Subchapter J to the Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation,
for instance, recommended that a subsection should be inserted into section 691 which
would define income in respect of a decedent. The Committee's proposed definition stated
that income in respect of a decedent was "an amount... which equals so much of the
proceeds of a sale, exchange, or other disposition of property made prior to the death of the
decedent, as would have been includible in the decedent's gross income if he had received
such proceeds." FiNAL REPORT OF SuBcHAPTmR J ADvisoR GROUP 61 (1958). Congress, how-
ever, declined to adopt the recommended definition. H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 14 (1960). Notably, the Treasury Department has, in fact, authored a definition of
income in respect of a decedent. The government's proposal states that items of income in
respect of a decedent are "those amounts to which a decedent was entitled as gross income
but which were not properly includible in computing his taxable income for the taxable year
ending with the date of his death or for a previous taxable year under the method of ac-
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troublesome when the transaction giving rise to what is claimed to
be income in respect of a decedent is the gain on a sale of a capital
asset.17 Accordingly, it is appropriate to assess the criteria which
have been and should be employed, in lieu of notions of accrual, to
determine when income in respect of a decedent has arisen upon
the disposition of a capital asset.
DETERMINING THE CAPITAL SALES PROCEEDS
SUBJECT TO SECTION 691 TREATMENT
Prior to 1954, it was the consensus of the tax bar that the de-
,cedent himself had to complete a sales transaction before that por-
tion of the proceeds representing gain would be taxed to his suc-
cessor as IRD.1 ' This conception, however, was dispelled by the
counting employed by the decedent." Tress. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b) (1957). This definition,
however, does not illuminate the scope of section 691, and therefore, is of no practical signif-
icance. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 10-11. Significantly, some items are statutorily de-
fined as income in respect of a decedent. See, e.g., LR.C. § 691(a)(4) (1980) (installment
obligations); id. § 3 (payments to a deceased partner's successor in interest). Nonetheless, in
the absence of a general statutory definition of the term "income in respect of a decedent,"
the courts have been constrained to determine on a case-by-case basis what is and what is
not such income. Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 939-40 (Ct. CL), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961). An early case, O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966
(2d Cir. 1949), held that a bonus paid to an employee's estate constituted income in respect
of a decedent, irrespective of whether the decedent could have enforced a right to the bonus
while he was alive. Id. at 968. In Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 871 (1954), the court held that section 126, now section 691, contemplated that
income derived from any source could be income in respect of a decedent. Id. at 7. Accord-
ingly, cases have found that a wide range of sources can generate IRD. For a general discus-
sion of the types of income items designated as income in respect of a decedent, see Miller,
Income in Respect of a Decedent-General, TAx MGMT. (BNA) No. 32-2d, at A-23 to A-43
(1981). Interestingly, one commentator has culled four characteristics of IRD from the cases:
(1) the item of income must have been attributable to decedent had he lived; (2) although
the decedent must have become "entitled" to the income by his death, his rights must not
have matured to the point where the item would be includible in his final income tax return;
(3) what is transferred at death must be a passive right to income; and (4) the recipient of
decedent's right to the income must have acquired the right solely by reason of decedents
death. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 12-13.
17 See M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDmuRL INcoME TAXATION OF ES-
TATEs ND BENF cL*AUES 177-84 (1970). See generally Ferguson, supra note 3, at 7-9;
Gordon, "Income in Respect of a Decedent" and Sales Transactions, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 30,
30-31; Klein, supra note 4, at 309; Knecht, The Inadvertent Realization of Income, 15 MA-
JOR TAx PLAN. 733, 745-46 (1963); Young, The Linde Case and... Inventories of Grain
and Livestock Held by a Deceased Cash Basis Farmer, 44 ILL. B.J. 44, 50-51 (1955); Note,
supra note 3, at 606-07 (1969); Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section
126, 65 HIv. L. Rav. 1024, 1031 (1952); Comment, Federal Income Taxation: "Right to
Income" as Test for Income in Respect of a Decedent, 53 MIN. L. Rzv. 1359, 1362 (1969).
11 Drye, The Taxation of a Decedent's Income, 8 TAx L. Ray. 201, 207 (1953); Tomlin-
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Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Linde.19 In Linde, a cash basis
farmer, who owned and operated vineyards, marketed wine grapes
by delivering them to wineries owned by cooperative marketing as-
sociations, of which he was a member. His grapes were commingled
with those of the other members and became part of a "wine pool,"
each member receiving net proceeds from the sales of the product
in proportion to their percentage interest in the pool. When the
farmer died, he held unliquidated interests in a number of wine
pools. A valuation was placed on the products for estate tax pur-
poses. Subsequently, the association marketed the wine on hand
and distributed the proceeds to the successor in interest.2 The
Commissioner contended that the proceeds constituted income in
respect of a decedent. The Tax Court rejected such a position, con-
cluding that since the cooperative did not sell the wine until after
the decedent's death, the proceeds could not be treated as section
126 income. Indeed, the court held that "[s]ince such sales were
not made during decedent's lifetime there could be no distributa-
ble proceeds due him when he died. Accordingly, no right to in-
come from this source arose during the decedent's lifetime."2 1 On
appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that proceeds
which had been realized merely as a consequence of the decedent's
negotiations were taxable to the decedent's successor in interest re-
gardless of the formal state of the transaction at the time of
death.2 2
son, How to Handle Income in Respect of a Decedent Under Section 691, 6 J. TAX. 250, 252
(1957); Note, supra note 3, at 609; see Young, supra note 17, at 46-50; Note, Income in
Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, 65 HA~v. L. Rlv. 1024, 1029-30 (1952). See
generally Polisher, Income in Respect to the Decedent-Its Federal Income and Estate
Tax Implications, 56 DiCK. L. REv. 269 (1952).
19 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
20 213 F.2d at 2.
21 17 T.C. 584, 594 (1951), rev'd, 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
22 213 F.2d at 4. In arriving at its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on
O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949), wherein the Second Circuit
held that a bonus which was neither fixed in amount during the decedents lifetime nor paid
until after his death was section 126 income. Id. at 967. In holding the bonus to be income
in respect of the decedent, O'Daniel's Estate established, at least in the area of personal
services, that it was not necessary for the decedent to have had an enforceable right to an
item during his lifetime for that item to be section 126 income. 173 F.2d at 968; see Bausch's
Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1951); Estate of Narischkine, 14 T.C.
1128, 1130 (1950); Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b)(3) (1960). Thus, in holding that the amounts
received by the decedent's widow were income in respect of a decedent, the Linde court
extended the O'Daniel's Estate rationale to include sales proceeds as well as compensation
for services. This decision, however, has prompted much criticism. E.g., Krieg & Busch-
mann, Section 126: "Items of Gross Income in Respect of a Decedent. . ..." 32 TAXEs 651,
[Vol. 56:419
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Despite the fact that Linde involved the disposition of ordi-
nary income property, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has ex-
tended its rationale to encompass sales of capital assets.2 Hence,
even though the sale of a capital asset may not have been consum-
mated during a decedent's lifetime, the proceeds from the transac-
tion will be income in respect of a decedent, taxable to the dece-
dent's successor upon its ultimate disposition, if the sale was
attributable to the decedent's economic activities. The criteria de-
terminative of those economic activities which will result in a find-
ing of IRD, however, presently defy predictability.24 Nonetheless,
the significance of such a finding is clear. The decedent's successor
in interest is denied the stepped-up basis usually available to a
person who acquires property from a decedent and, instead, must
report as taxable income the difference between the fair market
value on the date of distribution and the decedents basis in the
property.25 The following section examines the difficulties encoun-
tered by the courts in determining whether or not the sale of an
asset is attributable to the decedent's economic activities, thereby
giving rise to section 691 income.
653-54 (1954); Scott, The Strange Case of Commissioner v. Linde, 33 TAXEs 675, 676, 683
(1955).
" Holland, Kennedy, Surrey & Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income
Tax Treatment of Trusts and Estates-American Law Institute Draft, 53 CoLtU. L. Rv.
316, 370 (1953); Krieg & Buschmann, supra note 22, at 653; Scott, supra note 22, at 681-83;
Scott, A Critique of Section 126, 26 TAxEs 127, 129-30 (1948); Note, supra note 3, at 609.
See also note 115 infra. One commentator has asserted that reference to the congressional
committee reports on the bill enacted as the Revenue Act of 1942 indicates that section 126
was not intended to cover any income items "except realized income from interest, rent,
dividends, compensation for services and like items which are intrinsically income." Scott, A
Critique of Section 126, supra, at 129. See generally H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 411; S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-05,
reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 579-83 (implicitly indicates that the amendment providing
section 126 amounted to nothing more than a relief provision and was not intended to apply
to any items covered by the 1934 amendments).
I" Ferguson, supra note 3, at 13; see notes 44-83 and accompanying text infra. It is
clear, however, that "mere appreciation in the value of the decedents property before death
cannot later precipitate income in respect of a decedent." Ferguson, supra note 3, at 42; see
LR.C. § 1014(a) (1979); Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 C.B. 366-68.
,1 LR.C. § 1014(a) (1979). Section 1014(a) provides:
[T]he basis of property in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a
decedent ..- shall, if not sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of before the
decedent's death by such person, be - (1) the fair market value of the property at
the date of the decedent's death ....
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Trust Company of Georgia v. Ross
Involved in Ross 28 was the sale of the Dinkler Hotel chain,
owned by Carling Dinkler, Sr. and members of his family.2 7 On Au-
gust 4, 1960, an agreement was signed for the sale of the hotels to
the Associated Hotel Corporation.2 8 On January 30, 1961, approxi-
mately 1 month before the closing date, Carling Dinkler, Sr. died.
Shortly thereafter, the Associated Hotel Corporation notified coun-
sel for the Dinklers that it lacked $2,250,000, the funds necessary
to close the deal, and inquired whether the estate of Carling Din-
kler, Sr. would lend a covering amount.2 After considerable nego-
tiation, the principals of Associated obtained a $2,000,000 loan
from the Trust Company of Georgia, in which the Trust Company
as executor of the estate of Carling Dinkler, Sr. accepted a
$500,000 participation. On February 23, 1961, the transaction was
consummated.30
In the fiduciary income tax return for the fiscal year ending on
June 30, 1961, the executor reflected the fair market value of the
Dinkler hotel properties on the date of Carling Dinkler's death as
the basis for those properties sold to Associated. Thus, no gain was
reported on either the estate's or the beneficiaries' income tax re-
turns.31 The Commissioner, however, assessed a tax deficiency of
more than $1,000,000 against the estate, the decedent's successor
in interest, arguing that a gain had been realized on the sale.3 2 The
Commissioner's position was founded upon the assertion that it
was the decedent's economic activities, not those of the estate, that
had given rise to the sale, and therefore, the proceeds were within
the purview of section 691.33
The trial court, in Ross, initially observed that the policy of
section 691 was "'to see to it that the tax upon income which
would have been derived had the decedent lived should not be lost
to the treasury in consequence of his death.' " Accordingly, the
"' 262 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Ga. 1966), afl'd per curiam, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
262 F. Supp. at 901.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 903.
30 Id. at 903-04.
31 Id. at 904.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 906.
Id. at 908 (quoting Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 871 (1954)).
[Vol. 56:419
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court stated that if, on the date of death, a decedent had only to
await a closing to receive the sums due under a contract of sale
which he had negotiated, then the proceeds from the transaction
are an item of income in respect of a decedent because they are
attributable to the decedent's "economic activities. s35  Al-
though the court conceded that the sale was contingent upon the
occurrence of several events which had not yet transpired on the
date of Carling Dinkler's death,36 the court, nevertheless, dismissed
the extensive postdeath negotiations conducted by the executor as
"merely perfunctory," and held that the proceeds received by the
Dinkler estate were an item of income in respect of a decedent . 7
Notwithstanding its affirmance of the trial court's decision,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disapproved of the "open-en-
ded" nature of the test applied.38 In particular, the appellate court
considered unworkable the "causal-connection" test that would
find postmortem payments to be income in respect of a decedent if
they were the result of "the economic activities of the decedent." s
Rather, postulated the court, the crucial inquiry was whether, at
death, the decedent had a "right to [the] income," as distinguished
from having performed the activities which gave rise to that
right.40 The Fifth Circuit observed that its "right to income" or
"entitlement" test found support in the regulations, noting that
"[a]bsent such a right, no matter how great the [decedent's] activi-
ties or efforts, there would be no taxable income under [section]
691." 1 Significantly, the court found that Carling Dinlder, Sr. had
262 F. Supp. at 908-09.
"Id. at 909. By the nature of the contract, the conditions that remained unfulfilled at
the date of the decedent's death could not have been satisfied until the closing date of the
contract. For example, the consent of the mortgagee was to be obtained by the purchasers at
the closing. Id. at 910 n.3.
37 Id. at 909-10.
- 392 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). The court de-
clared that not only is an economic activities test unworkable, but it is inconsistent with
section 691, for it would allow income in respect of a decedent even when the decedent has
not acquired a right to income before death. 392 F.2d at 695; see note 41 and accompanying
text infra.
: 392 F.2d at 695 (quoting district court opinion, 262 F. Supp. at 908).
0 392 F.2d at 695.
41 Id. at 696 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.691(a)-l(b) (1960)). The Ross court relied on example
5 in 26 C.F.R. § 1.691(a)-2 to support its contention that the "causal connection" test em-
ployed by the district court might incorrectly find the proceeds as income in respect of a
decedent while the "entitlement" test would not. 392 F.2d at 696 n.3. Example 5 states:
A owned and operated an apple orchard. During his lifetime, A sold and de-
livered 1,000 bushels of apples to X, a canning factory, but did not receive pay-
1982]
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met the "entitlement" test insofar as the August 4 contract was
binding upon him before death and on his estate thereafter. 2
Keck v. Commissioner
In Keck,'3 the decedent was a minority shareholder in various
associated companies which had entered into an executory agree-
ment to sell their assets to Consolidated Freightways, Inc.4" The
contract was conditioned upon the purchaser's receiving the requi-
site approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and
the sellers' obtaining a favorable ruling from the Internal Revenue
Service declaring the gain realized on the sale exempt from federal
income taxation.4 5 On April 6, 1956, in accordance with the agree-
ment, the decedent delivered his shares to an escrow agent.46 All
dividends declared and paid with respect to these shares after this
date, however, were paid to the decedent. 7 Moreover, the decedent
continued to be the record owner of the shares and, until his death,
ment before his death. A also entered into negotiations to sell 3,000 bushels of
apples to Y, a canning factory, but did not complete the sale before his death.
After A's death, the executor received payment from X. He also completed the
sale to Y and transferred to Y 1,200 bushels of apples on hand at A's death and
harvested and transferred an additional 1,800 bushels. The gain from the sale of
apples by A to X constitutes income in respect of a decedent when received. On
the other hand, the gain from the sale of apples by the executor to Y does not.
26 C.F.R. § 1.691(a)-2 (1981). In this example, the sale to Y was not completed until after
A's death. Yet, A had conducted the negotiations for the sale prior to his death. The regula-
tions provide that the proceeds from the postdeath sale are not income in respect of a dece-
dent. This view comports with the result reached upon application of the "entitlement" test
since the decedent had no right to receive the income prior to his death, and therefore, the
proceeds realized from the transactions are not IRD. Under the "causal connection" test
employed by the district court and rejected by the Fifth Circuit, however, these proceeds
would likely be classified as IRD because the sale resulted from the negotiations or services
performed by A or from the economic activities he conducted during his lifetime. The stat-
ute, by its terms, consistently uses the phrase "right to receive the amount," and it appears
that irrespective of how substantial the economic activities of the decedent are, if no right to
the amount exists at the time of the decedents death, section 691 should not apply. See
I.R.C. § 691(a)(1)(A), (C).
42 392 F.2d at 696.
43 49 T.C. 313 (1968), rev'd, 415 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1969).
44 49 T.C. at 315. In a resolution adopted on May 2, 1956, the board of directors for
Motor Cargo, Inc. proposed to sell its property to Consolidated Freightways, Inc. Id. at 315-
16.
41 Id. at 316. Section 337(a) of the IRC provides that if a corporation liquidates within
12 months of adopting a liquidation plan, there shall be no gain or loss to the corporation on
the dispostion of its assets. I.R.C. § 337(a).
46 49 T.C. at 316.
47 Id.
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continued to exercise all voting rights.48 On May 25, 1956, applica-
tion was made to the ICC for approval of the sale. Final approval
was received on May 5, 1960. In the interim, however, on Nov-
ember 27, 1958, Keck died.49
The Tax Court, in an opinion rendered a few days before the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Trust Company, viewed Keck as consis-
tent with the circuit court's decision in that case because, from the
time of the execution of the agreement, the decedent "merely
awaited final approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission"
to consummate the disposition of his shares.50 Indeed, the court, in
adopting an "economic activities" test, stated, "[w]e do not believe
that the activities of third parties ... can be regarded as economic
activities of [decedent's executor] so as to prevent the application
of section 691 to the payments received by [the successors in inter-
est]." '51 Upon determining that the decedent had, before his death,
engaged in "all the significant economic activity" necessary to sell
his corporate assets, the Tax Court held that the gain from the
proceeds of the sale clearly constituted income in respect of a dece-
dent.52 Six judges vigorously dissented, arguing that the proper
test should be "the status of the transaction at decedent's death,
not who carried on the 'economic activity' which brought it to that
status."5 3
Interestingly, the Tax Court deemed immaterial its finding of
fact that the decedent was a minority shareholder and was not a
party to the agreement.54 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed, finding that the decedent's position and activities
were indeed significant.5 5 The appellate court observed that at no
time had the decedent acquired the right to income since "at the
48 Id.
49 Id.
" Id. at 320. The Tax Court compared Keck with Trust Co. and noted that in each case
the decedent had entered into a written agreement for the sale of stock, and thereupon,
placed the stock in escrow. Moreover, both cases involved sales which were contingent on
the government's approval of section 337 tax treatment. Finally, in both cases, the sales
were consummated after the decedent had died. Id. at 322.
51 Id. at 321.
52 Id. at 320, 323.
53 Id. at 323-24 (Featherton, J., dissenting). Judge Featherton authored an opinion in
which five judges joined.
" See 49 T.C. at 316. The decedent owned approximately 10% of Motor Cargo, Inc.'s
outstanding stock. The majority shareholder, Owen W. Orr, held approximately 75% of the
shares. Id. at 314.
5 415 F.2d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'g 49 T.C. 313 (1968).
1982]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
time of his death, neither the decedent nor the other stockholders
were contractually committed to the plan to liquidate . . . [since]
the majority stockholder, for reasons of his own, might have de-
cided not to liquidate." 8 Moreover, it was noted that the sale was
subject to a number of contingencies-in particular, approval by
the ICC which "was neither routine nor perfunctory." 57 In holding
for the taxpayer, the court relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit's re-
jection of the economic activities test:
We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in holding that the right to income, under the provi-
sion of the statute here pertinent, is to be distinguished from the
economic activities that create that right and that, absent such a
right, no matter how great the activities, there is no taxable in-
come under Section 691.58
Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner
In Sidles, 59 the decedent was the sole shareholder of Bi-State
Distributing Corporation. At a special meeting on February 28,
1968, Bi-State's board of directors adopted a plan of complete liq-
uidation and dissolution pursuant to section 337 of the IRC and
section 21-2083 of the Nebraska Business Corporation Act.61 The
following day, Bi-State filed a statement of intent to dissolve with
the Nebraska secretary of state.62 Prior to the decedent's death on
June 12, 1968, no further action was taken on the liquidation plan.
Nevertheless, in late November of 1968, the plan was imple-
mented.63 Thereupon, the Commissioner claimed that Bi-State's
liquidating distribution was income in respect of a decedent."
The Tax Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Trust
Co. and found that "the transaction had sufficiently matured as of
" 415 F.2d at 534.
57 Id.; cf. Falwell v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 71, 79 (W.D. Va. 1946), aff'd per curiam,
330 U.S. 807 (1947) (ICC approval, necessary to effectuate a purchase agreement, is not a
mere matter of form and, therefore, is not perfunctory).
8 415 F.2d at 534-35.
59 65 T.C. 873 (1976), acq. 1976-44 I.R.B. 5, afl'd mem., 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
0 65 T.C. at 874.
1 Id. at 875. Section 21-2083 of the Nebraska Business Corporation Act prescribes a
formal voluntary dissolution procedure. Notably, it is provided that no filing of intent to
dissolve becomes final until it has been approved by shareholders' vote. See NEB. Rav. STAT.
§ 21-2083 (1977).
62 65 T.C. at 875.
63 Id.
Id. at 876.
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decedent's death so as to create in him a right to receive the in-
come when it was subsequently realized." 5 The postmortem reso-
lution of the Bi-State board of directors to distribute the assets in
liquidation, the declaration of the liquidating dividend, and the
filing of the articles of dissolution were characterized by the court
as "mere formalities."66 Moreover, the concurring opinion noted
that Nebraska law obligates the corporation to cease doing busi-
ness and to distribute its assets once a statement of intent to dis-
solve has been filed.e7 Thus, barring any action by the board, a
shareholder may sue to compel such a dissolution. Accordingly,
since the filing of the statement "vested" the shareholder "with a
legal right to the proceeds,"6 8 the court likened this situation to
the enforceable executory contract of sale in Trust Co."'
Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner
The most recent pronouncement in this area is the opinion of
the Tax Court in Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner.70 In Peter-
son, the decedent had contracted to deliver calves to a buyer in
two installments, one on November 1, 1972 and the other on De-
cember 15.71 The decedent died, however, on November 9, 1972
without having made delivery under the contract.7 2 In order to
complete the agreement, the estate "daily fed, watered, and cared
for the calves from the date of decedent's death" until delivery in
mid-December, 1972.7' The Commissioner claimed that the income
generated by the estate's postmortem deliveries was IRD.74
11 Id. at 880. The court stated that although the economic activities of the decedent are
a relevant consideration, they are not dispositive to a finding of income in respect of a dece-
dent. Indeed, for there to be IRD, the court concluded, the decedent must have acquired a
right to the income prior to his death. Id. (citing Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694, 695
(5th Cir. 1967)).
" 65 T.C. at 881-82. But see Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275, 279 (8th Cir.
1972). Hudspeth involved an analogous situation, yet the court held that the facts were
sufficient merely to create a presumption of intent to dissolve. Id. See also Kinsey v. Com-
missioner, 477 F.2d 1058, 1063 (2d Cir. 1973).
17 65 T.C. at 887 (Hall, J., concurring) (citing NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2085 to 2086
(1977)).
65 T.C. at 888 (Hall, J., concurring).
69 Id.
70 74 T.C. 630 (1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981).
71 74 T.C. at 634.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 644.
7" Id. at 635. In Peterson, the Commissioner contended that the court's inquiry should
focus upon the substantial activities of the decedent and the status of those efforts at the
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The Tax Court rejected the Government's contention. 5 At the
outset, the court noted that the contract, upon the November 1
default in delivery, had been modified implicitly to call for a single
delivery on December 15.76 Since only two-thirds of the calves were
deliverable on the date of the decedent's death, the court reasoned
that, "[v]iewed in its entirety," the contract could not have been
performed by the decedent while he was alive.77 Accordingly, the
acts of the estate "were not perfunctory or ministerial but [were]
substantial and essential. '78 Thus, the court concluded, "the con-
tribution by the estate [was] sufficient to remove the sale proceeds
from the reach of section 691."'
The present relevance of Peterson is that the Tax Court
clearly articulated the four requirements which have been applied
to decide whether a decedent possessed the right to sales proceeds
at the time of his death: (1) "the decedent. . entered into a le-
gally significant arrangement"; (2) "the decedent . . . performed
the substantive (nonministerial) acts required of him as precondi-
tions to the sale"; (3) "there existed, at the time of decedent's
death, no economically material contingencies which might have
disrupted the sale"; (4) "decedent, himself, would have eventually
received . . . the sale proceeds if he had lived."80 The following
discussion involves a similar reexamination of the cases in search
of the relevant factors used in determining whether section 691 is
applicable. The formulations will provide a basis for evaluating the
continuing viability of the concept of IRD.
Reexamination: In Search of Relevant Factors
1. The "Mere Formalities" Test
The Sidles case categorically stated that a right to income has
time of the decedent's death. In this regard, the Commissioner postulated that the decedent
was entitled to the proceeds on the sale. Id. at 645 n.21.
1 Id. at 644.
76 Id. at 635.
77Id" at 644.
78 Id.
7 Id. at 644-45. The court, in its conclusion, analogized its position to being "left to
chart our own course in the murky waters of section 691." Id. at 645 n.21. Surprisingly, in
Peterson, the Commissioner did not attempt to allocate the sale proceeds between those
calves which were deliverable on the date of the decedent's death and those which were not
and label only the former IRD. Had the Commissioner done so, at least one judge on the
court would have supported him. See id. at 646-47 (Simpson, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 639-41.
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been acquired by the decedent if all that remained to be done at
the time of death were "mere formalities: ministerial acts."' Un-
fortunately, however, the "mere formalities" test is subject to sev-
eral interpretations. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Keck did
not think that the requisite ICC approval of the sale in question
was a "mere formality." Indeed, if one applies a "but for" test, no
prerequisites to a completed sale will be viewed as mere formali-
ties. 2 Nevertheless, as a matter of common sense, many conditions
to sales are mere formalities.
Although the "mere formalities" test was reaffirmed by the
Tax Court in Peterson, the court's opinion added little to its con-
tent. The court simply stated that once the "subject matter of the
sale was in a deliverable state," the decedent had acquired a right
to income. 3 Additionally, the court used "deliverable" to describe
the situation wherein only ministerial acts remained to be per-
formed at the time of the seller's death. Nonetheless, it is not in-
conceivable that a crop might be in a deliverable state while non-
ministerial acts remain to be performed prior to the completion of
the sale. In affirming Peterson, the Eighth Circuit seems to have
seized upon precisely this point. To separate the test from the na-
ture of the subject matter, the court emphasized that even if the
subject matter were "logs or refrigerators" there could be no IRD
without "delivery." 8 '
The paramount flaw in the "mere formalities" test is its hind-
sight application. After the fact, preconditions leading to a con-
summated sale appear to be mere formalities, but if the estate fails
81 Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 881, acq. 1976-44 I.R.B. 5, aff'd mem.,
553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977). For the most recent application of the "ministerial acts" test,
see Rev. Rul. 78-32, 1978-1 C.B. 198.
82 For a classic example of the "but for" analysis, see Estate of Peterson v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 630 (1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981). Therein, the court stated that,
"had the estate not daily fed, watered, and cared for the calves from the date of decedent's
death until the delivery date, [the] calves would have perished." Id. at 644. The court's
contention was that the handling of calves which were not mature enough on the date of the
decedent's death to be delivered caused the estate to perform acts which "were not perfunc-
tory or ministerial but substantial and essential." Id. This was also true, however, of the
mature cattle. That is, even if all the cattle had been mature enough for delivery prior to the
decedent's death, he or his estate would have had to continue to feed or water them until
they were actually delivered. Nonetheless, the whole tenor of the court's opinion is that the
right to income arose when the cattle became deliverable, not when they were actually deliv-
ered. The court's point appears to be that, after maturity, the feeding and watering of the
cattle were ministerial acts, but prior to maturity they were substantial and essential.
83 Id. at 640.
U, Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 667 F.2d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 1981).
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to perform one of these formal conditions, so as to vitiate a trans-
action, the mere formality becomes somewhat more substantial. In
sum, the "mere formalities" test is less a guide to analysis and pre-
dictability than a label attached after a result has been obtained.
2. The "Parted with Property" Test
In explaining its determination of whether the seller had per-
formed "the applicable substantive acts" before death, the Peter-
son court stated that one indication would be whether "the subject
matter. . .[had passed] beyond. . .[the decedent's] control prior
to his death." 85 Apparently, this was the basis on which the court
distinguished Linde, wherein the decedent had delivered his crop
of grapes to a cooperative marketing association and the coopera-
tive sold the wine after the decedent's death.8 6 Proceeds from the
Linde sale were treated as IRD. Thus, while a parting of the prop-
erty, absent a sale of the goods as of death, was found to add up to
taxability in Linde, a binding contract of sale, absent a parting of
the property, resulted in nontaxability in Peterson.
Although the factual situation involving one who has parted
with property but who has not yet made a sale would seem to be
rare, the Trust Co. case demonstrates that it can arise in a variety
of instances. The Trust Co. court stressed the fact that Carling
Dinkler, Sr., had parted with his property when he deposited his
shares with an escrow agent. 7 In both Linde and Trust Co., the
respective decedents, upon parting with their property, were irrev-
ocably committed to a sale. Thus, the Linde/Trust Co. rule is that
although a sale is not required to generate income in respect of a
decedent, what is required is a parting with the property such that
the seller is irrevocably committed to a sale during his lifetime.
Applying this analysis to Sidles, we find that Nebraska law re-
85 74 T.C. at 640. The Peterson court noted that the nature and scope of the ."delivery"
activities of the decedent should be tailored to the subject matter of the sale. For example,
the "acts required of a decedent to make stock deliverable are generally ministerial in na-
ture." Id. (citing Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 881 (1976), acq. 1976-44
I.R.B. 5, aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977)). In contrast, the court noted, a sale which
necessitates "the sweat of the decedent's brow" poses harder questions of deliverability. 74
T.C. at 640.
86 See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
11 Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. 900, 909 (N.D. 1966), afl'd, 392 F.2d 694, 698
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). The district court had observed that Din-
kier was "contractually bound to sell... to particular purchasers and was not free to sell
...to any other persons." Id.
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quired the corporation to cease doing business and to distribute its
assets once the statement of intent to dissolve had been filed. The
situation in Sidles, however, was not as irrevocable as the Tax
Court would have it appear, for Nebraska law also provides that
the shareholders can revoke a voluntary dissolution proceeding.88
In Sidles, therefore, the taxpayer could have reversed the dissolu-
tion transaction, an unlikely, but nonetheless possible, event.89
More importantly, it is probable that a sophisticated executor will
renegotiate or even breach a contract after the seller-decedent's
death in order to avoid an IRD characterization of the sale's pro-
ceeds.90 Because qualifying for a section 1014(a) step-up in basis
may yield a substantial tax advantage, the executor could renegoti-
ate an agreement by passing along part of the tax savings to the
buyer in the form of a lower price.91
"s NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2087 to 2088 (1977). Section 21-2088 provides: "By the act of
the corporation, a corporation may, at any time prior to the issuance of a certificate of
dissolution. . . revoke voluntary dissolution proceedings. . . ." Id. § 21-2088.
81 A breach of contract might not always be involved in an executor's refusal to per-
form. The simplest example would be a liquidation, as in Sidles. In Estate of Kriesel, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 264 (1978), the Kriesel Company, wholly owned by the decedent, adopted a
plan of complete liquidation on September 27, 1969, as a step in the sale of some of the
assets of the Kriesel Company to National Car Rental Systems, Inc. The decedent died
before the actual liquidation took place. "The plan of liquidation was subsequently re-
scinded on September 9, 1970, due to the untimely death of Ralph and the possible adverse
income tax consequences to petitioner as the sole shareholder of the Kriesel Company." Id.
at 265. Footnote five of the Tax Court opinion makes it clear that these "adverse tax conse-
quences" were IRD treatment and loss of the section 1014 step-up in basis. "On June 30,
1972, the Kriesel Company was finally liquidated and its assets distributed to petitioner."
Id. at 265 n.5. It would be interesting to see a court or the IRS attempt to apply this "part-
ing with the property" analysis to the situation wherein a decedent leases property during
his lifetime, with the lessee receiving an option to buy, and with the lessee exercising such
option after the decedent's death. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 37.
90 Contract rescission is not a taxable event. See LR.C. § 1038; S. REP. No. 1681, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964) (Congress "does not believe that merely because property originally
held by a seller has been restored to him should constitute grounds to taxing any apprecia-
tion in value of this property to the seller at that time"). With this in mind, an astute
executor may be tempted to rescind and renegotiate an executory contract of sale in order
to make available to the estate a section 1014(a) step-up in basis. In so doing, however, the
executor should be aware of Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), wherein the
Court refused tax effectiveness to a rescission and renegotiation situation because the sole
benefit to the taxpayer was a reduction in taxes. Id. at 366. Moreover, should the sale be to
the same buyer, it is likely that the IRS would treat the transaction as lacking in "business
purpose" and, therefore, a sham. See Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the
Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuL. L. Rav. 355, 360 (1963).
91 See Brown, Income in Respect of a Decedent, 55 CoRNELL L. REV. 211, 224 n.75
(1970); Note, Tax Effect of Executor's Rescission and Renegotiation of Decedent's Con-
tracts, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 251, 254 (1966). One commentator has argued that a distinction
should be made between contracts which are specifically enforceable and those for which an
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In light of the Keck decision, the Linde/Trust Co. rule may
require still further refinement.2 Recall that in Keck, the court
held that the gain from the sale of the decedent's stock was not
income in respect of a decedent because the ultimate decision to
sell rested in the hands of a third party, the majority shareholder.
The decedent, however, was irrevocably bound to sell if a sale was
consummated by the majority shareholder, and like the decedents
in Linde and Trust Co., could not have rescinded the deal on his
own accord. Nevertheless, the court concluded that no right to in-
come had arisen from the predeath irrevocable commitment of the
seller to perform. Thus, it can be seen that the "parted with the
property" test is determinative in a case like Linde, but otherwise
is entitled to little weight. 3
3. Commitment of the Buyer: The "Relation Back" Test
In the recent case of Claiborne v. United States,94 it was inti-
mated that the posture of the transaction from the buyer's stand-
point is a relevant consideration. Specifically, the court suggested
that an inquiry should be made to determine whether the buyer
was irrevocably committed to the sale. 5 In Claiborne, the decedent
had extended a purchase option on her farm and had agreed to
accept partial payment in the form of another farm if the option
action for damages will lie. Guterman, New Problems Under Section 126 in Income and
Estate Taxes, 24 TAXEs 633, 637 (1946). For criticism of this view, see Gordon, supra note
17, at 38.
9 2 The Keck decision intimates that the Linde/Trust Co. rule should be refined so as to
give consideration to the fact that a party to the transaction, other than the seller, might
not perform. Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1969); see notes 94-105 and
accompanying text infra.
" Interestingly, while the Peterson court cited Trust Co. for the proposition that deliv-
ery of stock to an escrow agent is an "indicium" of a sufficiently completed sale, the court
nonetheless observed that the result in Trust Co. "would not be any different if the dece-
dent... had held his stock until death." Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 630,
641 n.12 (1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981).
" 449 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Ky. 1978), vacated and remanded, 648 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1981).
Claiborne is a unique case insofar as there had been substantial performance by both the
buyer and the seller prior to completing the sale. Interestingly, the district court deemed
this fact immaterial. 449 F. Supp. at 6. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however,
thought this fact significant and vacated the lower court's decision. 648 F.2d at 451-52. In-
deed, the appellate court concluded that, at the time of the decedent's death, the buyer's
activities had entitled the seller to specific performance. This "equitable entitlement," the
court held, was a significant factor upon which a finding of IRD could be predicated. Id.
95 449 F. Supp. at 6.
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was exercised.96 The agreement further provided that if the option
was exercised, it became a binding contract upon the parties.97 On
August 12, 1967, the prospective purchaser notified the decedent
that it would exercise its option.98 On August 15, 1967, the dece-
dent's son, acting under a power of attorney, turned over posses-
sion of the farm to the optionee.9 9 The decedent died on October 1,
1967, prior to giving a deed to the buyer and prior to receipt of the
optionee's consideration. 100 Arguing that only "the pro forma act of
executing the deed" remained undone on the date of the dece-
dent's death, the Commissioner claimed that the decedent was
"entitled" to the income which the estate would generate by the
eventual sale.101 The court rejected this argument, stating that the
Commissioner's "argument overlooks the possibility of a default by
[the buyer] .... Mrs. Simcoe could not have compelled Houston
McCord Realty Corporation to purchase the property had it
elected not to perform."102 Notably, on appeal to the Sixth Circuit,
the court reversed. The circuit court found that under Kentucky
law, once an optionee has taken full possession of the realty, the
optionor has a right to specific performance.103 More importantly,
the court held that the test of taxability was the "enforceability of
. . . [seller's] right to the full purchase price as of the date of her
death," and specifically rejected the Commissioner's argument that
the test for taxability was the "economic activities" test "which
would exclude any consideration of enforceability as an aspect of
entitlement.' 104
The difficulty with this "enforceability against the buyer" test
is that, if it were applied to Trust Co., it would militate in favor of
the taxpayer because the Dinklers could not have compelled Asso-
ciated to perform. Indeed, in Trust Co., the agreement provided
" Id. at 5.
9Id.
98 Id.
9 Id. Although the purchaser had taken possession of the farm and had begun renova-
tion, the court dismissed the significance of these facts, noting that there were "serious
doubt[s]" concerning the son's authority to transfer possession under his power of attorney.
Id. at 6.
100 Id. at 5.
1 Id. at 6.
102 Id. The court accorded substantial significance to the liquidated damages clause in
the Simcoe/McCord agreement.
103 Claiborne v. United States, 648 F.2d 448, 451 (6th Cir. 1981), vacating and remand-
ing 449 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Ky. 1978).
104 648 F.2d at 451-52.
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for liquidated damages in the event the purchaser failed to obtain
the requisite financing.105 In the context of the buyer's posture at
the time of the decedent's death, therefore, the only viable ap-
proach is to look at what actually happened after the death of the
seller. If the buyer fails to perform or, for that matter, if the seller
fails to perform, the situation is unlikely to appear in the law re-
ports because the Commissioner does not attempt to assert section
691 coverage to transactions which are not completed. For exam-
ple, despite the theory of the "entitlement" test espoused in Si-
dles, wherein liquidation had been completed but for a few minis-
terial acts at the time of the decedent's death, the Commissioner
would not have asserted section 691 liability if the liquidation had
been revoked. Thus, in the final analysis, a "relation back" theory
is used in which the ultimate performance of the buyer is related
back to the situation immediately prior to the decedent's death.
Note, however, that absent a sale, there can be no relation back.
Accordingly, the language in Linde which states that section 691
does not require a sale is somewhat misleading. To be precise, the
Linde court should have stated that although section 691 does not
require a sale before the death of the decedent, there ultimately
must be a sale to make the transaction taxable. With this in mind,
the Linde/Trust Co. test can be restated: a transaction will be con-
sidered complete for purposes of section 691 when, at the time of
the decedent-seller's death, he was irrevocably committed to com-
pleting the transaction and the buyer eventually performed in ac-
cordance with the terms of the agreement. Unfortunately, this for-
mulation does not account for the holding in Keck, wherein no
section 691 liability was found even though the decedent was com-
mitted to the sale and the purchaser did perform in accordance
with the terms of the agreement. Hence, another factor, the "antic-
ipated contingency," must be added to the Linde/Trust Co.
formula.
4. The "Anticipated Contingency" Test
In Trust Co., the Fifth Circuit held that Carling Dinkler, Sr.
had earned the income from the sale of his hotels because, had
everything proceeded as anticipated on the date of death, the dece-
dent would have had an unqualified right to the income. No con-
101 Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. p00, 902 (N.D. Ga. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 694
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
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tingencies were expected which would have cast uncertainty on the
completion of the transaction or the subsequent receipt of the pro-
ceeds. In Keck, on the other hand, the sale explicitly was contin-
gent upon ICC approval, an issue unresolved at the time of the
decedent's death.
In retrospect, it is now known that the sale in Keck took place
precisely as planned while the sale in Trust Co. had to be salvaged
by a last-minute loan from the seller's estate. It seems ironic to
credit Carling Dinkler, Sr. with having realized the income from
the sale while holding that the decedent's claim to sales proceeds
in Keck was too contingent at the time of death to have been a
"right to income."'10 6 Accordingly, decisional law appears to dictate
that the predeath anticipation of the nonoccurrence of a contin-
gency will vitiate a finding of a completed sale for the purpose of
section 691. This rule, however, is not a reasonable standard for
decision-making purposes. For example, an almost universal re-
quirement in contracts for the sale of real property is that the
seller deliver good title at the closing. If this anticipated contin-
gency were recognized as such, no contract for the sale of real
property could ever give rise to income in respect of a decedent.
Moreover, the "anticipated contingency" test will allow sophisti-
cated estate planners to escape the ambit of section 691 by in-
serting into every contract a clause requiring a sale by the taxpayer
if alive at the time of closing or a sale by the estate.07 An even
simpler method is to include a clause nullifying the sale in the
event of the seller's death.10 8
To this point, analysis of the cases wherein the sale of a capi-
tal asset has not been completed before the seller's death suggests
that the prerequisites for a finding of a right to income under sec-
tion 691 are: (1) an irrevocable commitment on the part of the
seller as evidenced by a parting with the subject property; (2) per-
formance by the buyer and all other parties in accordance with the
"0 See Chapin v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 140, 142-43 (8th Cir. 1950). It appears that
had the parties stipulated that their agreement was contingent upon the purchaser indepen-
dently raising the purchase money, the result in Trust Co. would have been different. On
the other hand, the Trust Co. agreement did provide that the escrow agent should return
the shares if the purchaser was unable to procure financing. Brief for Appellant at 7, Trust
Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). See
generally Comment, supra note 17, at 1363 & n.30.
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) (ex. 4) (1960); Brown, supra note 91, at 229-30 & n.93.
See generally Krieg & Buschmann, supra note 22, at 651.
108 See generally note 91 and accompanying text supra.
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contract as it existed at the time of the seller's death; and (3) no
substantial anticipated contingency in the contract remaining un-
fulfilled at the time of the seller's death. As applied, this formula-
tion is elementary in a factual setting such as that presented in
Linde, but cumbersome, and perhaps inequitable, in the genre of
cases represented by Trust Co. and Sidles. The contrast in appli-
cation, however, suggests a better approach to the right to income
problem.
5. The Capital v. Inventory Assets Test
If Peterson and Linde are compared to Trust Co., Keck, and
Sidles, one discerns that the cases are immediately distinguishable
because the former involve the sale of ordinary income property
while the latter involve the sale of capital assets. The courts, how-
ever, have failed to recognize a crucial distinction between these
types of transactions. Sales in the ordinary course of business usu-
ally take place in a routine way. On the other hand, when capital
assets are sold, the sale is of a less common property and by a
seller who is not, by definition, in the business of trading in such
properties. Such sales are not routine and problems often do arise.
The Trust Co. case illustrates the common difficulty of a buyer
being unable to arrange financing. What this suggests, therefore, is
that the "right to income," or "entitlement," test should be con-
fined to sales of ordinary income property where the final stages of
the transactions occur as a routine matter. When the property in-
volved is a capital asset, however, a sale transaction should be
found to give rise to income in respect of a decedent only when
there is a completed sale before death.109 This approach would
limit IRD treatment in capital asset cases to installment sales.
Drawing a distinction between capital assets and inventory
property is not a new idea,110 for it was asserted early that section
109 It has been argued that Treasury Regulation § 1.691(a)-2(b), example 5, incorpo-
rates the notion that a completed sale is required to trigger an application of section 691.
-0 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 17, at 39. Professor Gordon postulated that in the
context of capital sales transactions, section 691 treatment should be limited to closed trans-
actions. Id. at 42. His argument was predicated on the differential effect death would have
on a seller's reliance on section 1014(a):
[A]s to [sales in the ordinary course of business], the taxpayer has little choice in
timing and therefore, his reliance in the policy of section 1014 is minimal, whereas
in sporadic sale situations [such as the sale of a capital asset] he may well decide
to withhold because of the basis step-up advantage of that provision.
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691 was not intended to apply to sales of capital assets.,,, We now
know that this argument failed in the courts because no basis for
drawing the distinction was found in the history of section 691 or
its predecessors.112 The point being made presently, however, is
somewhat different. It is not argued that the gain from the sale of
capital assets should be excluded totally from section 691 treat-
ment, but rather, that in determining whether a transaction has
taken place giving rise to such income, the "entitlement" test
should be confined to sales of inventory property.1
The principal advantage of this approach is the substitution of
a clear guideline in place of a rather cumbersome rule as presently
divined from the cases. Additionally, it is advantageous insofar as
the requirement for a closed transaction cannot be abused as a
means of tax avoidance. All of the transactions in the subject cases
were entered into by taxpayers who anticipated completion while
alive. If the taxpayers had known exactly when they were going to
die, good tax planners would have counseled them to forego the
sale and allow their executors or heirs to sell the property and ob-
tain the advantage of the step-up in basis. Moreover, as earlier
noted, successors in interest may be tempted to avoid an incom-
plete sales transaction by revoking the contract and starting
Id. at 39.
"' See note 23 supra. Under section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1934, capital
assets were not reportable as "accrued" income. Estate of Burnett v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.
897, 903 (1943). Thus, since section 126 was enacted solely to alleviate the hardship inherent
in bunching income items into the decedent's final tax return, see notes 6-11 and accompa-
nying text supra, originally it was argued that Congress had not intended to place into IRD
a wider range of income items than had previously been reportable under section 42. See,
e.g., Scott, supra note 23, at 130. This argument found support in the congressional commit-
tee records which revealed no intent to dispel the distinction between ownership of capital
assets and ownership of ordinary rights to earned income. See id. at 129. Indeed, this was
the initial position of the Tax Court. See Estate of Remington v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 99,
107 (1947) (a specific finding that earned insurance commissions were not capital assets
required before subjecting them to tax as income in respect of a decedent). This argument,
however, loses a good deal of its force when it is considered that Remington did not face the
issue of the proper tax treatment of a sale of capital assets, and Burnett was concerned with
inventory. See generally Gordon, supra note 17, at 33 & n.23. The contemporary argument
for excluding sales of capital assets from section 691 treatment equates a right to payment
with the asset. One is the substitute for the other. Holland, Kennedy, Surrey & Warren,
supra note 23, at 370. See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 41.
112 See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 148. For a general discussion of the need to distin-
guish between ordinary income and capital gain items under section 691, see Holland, Ken-
nedy, Surrey & Warren, supra note 23, at 367-72.
'Is Another solution to the capital asset problem-making death a realization-was
suggested in 1969. See 1969 Treas. Proposals at 338-39, 347-48.
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afresh. 114 By finding section 691 income only when there is a com-
pleted sale of a capital asset, these problems will be avoided. Addi-
tional issues are presented, however, even when it is clear that an
item is income in respect of a decedent. The next section will ex-
plore the inconsistent treatment accorded to the section 691(c) de-
duction available to the recipients of IRD.
THE SECTION 691(c) DEDUCTION
In the ordinary course of events, income is collected prior to
death and an income tax is paid thereon. Upon the death of the
income earner, the net item is included in his gross estate for es-
tate tax purposes.115 In contrast, IRD is realized after the taxpayer
has died and is included in his gross estate for tax purposes with-
out being reduced by the payment of an income tax." Addition-
ally, the recipient of the IRD is subject to income taxation without
the advantage of a step-up in basis.1 1 7 Section 691(c) was designed
to ameliorate the impact of this double taxation upon IRD.118 It
provides that the recipient of IRD may deduct from his income tax
that portion of the estate tax which is attributable to the inclusion
of the item in the decedent's estate.119 Unusual results sometimes
114 See notes 91-92 and accompanying text supra.
1I When computing the value of the gross estate, the executor is required to include
the value of all property of the decedent, regardless of its nature. I.R.C. § 2033. Upon the
death of the income earner, the net item enters the estate for tax purposes. By contrast,
income in respect of a decedent is realized after the cash basis taxpayer has died. See LR.C.
§ 691(a). Accordingly, the income item enters the taxpayer's estate for estate tax purposes
without first having been reduced by the payment of an income tax. Parenthetically, no
reduction in the value of the item is permitted "for whatever income tax may be assessed
against its ultimate recipient." Ferguson, supra note 3, at 147 (footnote omitted). Income in
respect of a decedent, therefore, bears a proportionately heavier share of estate tax than
does predeath income.
11 See note 115 supra.
117 The interplay of sections 691 and 1014 works to prevent items of income in respect
of a decedent from receiving a step-up in basis. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 3, at 148;
Klein, supra note 4, at 304.
Il Congress, in enacting section 691(c), intended to mitigate the harshness of double
taxation of items of income in respect of a decedent. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
87-89, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4720; cf. H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4137, 4360 (section
691(c) deduction allocated between estate or trust and beneficiaries). More importantly, the
courts have upheld this congressional objective. See Read v. United States, 320 F.2d 550,
553 (5th Cir. 1963); Goodwin v. United States, 458 F.2d 108, 112 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Meissner v.
United States, 364 F.2d 409, 412, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
19 Section 691(c) of the Code provides in part:
A person who includes an amount [of income in respect of a decedent] in
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obtain, however, because the deduction, used to reduce the recipi-
ent's income, is determined by reference to the decedent's margi-
nal estate tax rate while the income tax for the item of income in
respect of a decedent is computed at the recipient's rate. Never-
theless, what is particularly troublesome is the restrictive and, per-
haps, inequitable limitation presently imposed upon the recipients
use of the section 691(c) deduction. This problem is best under-
stood in light of the varied and apparently contradictory pro-
nouncements of the Commissioner over the past several years.
In Read v. United States,12 0 the taxpayer was an estate which
had ordinary income of $30,624 and long term capital gains
amounting to $1,185,318.121 Additionally, the estate, the decedent's
successor in interest, had available a section 691(c) deduction to-
taling $184,996.122 In calculating the income tax due, the taxpayer
first subtracted the amount of the 691(c) deduction from the total
of long term capital gains and then applied the alternative tax rate
of twenty-five percent to the balance.123 This resulted in a tax due
of $250,080.124 The Commissioner maintained that the 691(c) de-
duction could not be used to offset a capital gain calculated under
the alternate method.12 5 This position was founded upon the asser-
tion that Congress had been sufficiently generous in providing the
alternative method as a means of tax relief and that, therefore, the
reform's benefits should not be expanded beyond those explicitly
grass income... shall be allowed, for the same taxable year, as a deduction an
amount which bears the same ratio to the estate tax attributable to the net value
for estate tax purposes of all the items [of income in respect of a decedent].
I.R.C. § 691(c)(1)(A). For an overview of the manner in which this deduction is computed,
see Klein, supra note 4, at 308-09. See also Holland, Kennedy, Surrey & Warren, supra note
23, at 361-77 (ALI recommendation to Congress on section 691(c), submitted prior to pas-
sage). The ALI draft proposed that the section 691(c) deduction be limited to the estate tax
paid on that portion of IRD in excess of basis. This proposal was founded upon the premise
that the portion of IRD represented by basis is not taxable, and therefore, "it is improper to
grant as estate tax deduction for that portion of the right." Holland, Kennedy, Surrey &
Warren, supra note 23, at 371.
220 320 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1963).
"1 Id. at 551-52. The figures have been modified slightly to eliminate extraneous
sources of income and to simplify the discussion.
1" Id. at 550.
123 LR.C. § 1201(b) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 401(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2861, 2866,
2871 (1978)).
24 320 F.2d at 552. The taxpayer first took the amount of the 691(c) deduction,
$184,996, from the total of long-term capital gains $1,185,318, and then applied the alterna-
tive tax rate. (($1,185,318 - $184,996) x .25 = $250,080).
125 Id.
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authorized.12 Although the argument sounded reasonable, the tax-
payer, given the figures in the case, would have lost the benefit of
more than $150,000 in deductions, and the tax due on the capital
gain would have been $296,329, an increase of $46,249. Conceiva-
bly, because these facts presented a strong case for the taxpayer,
the Fifth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's argument, finding
that there was no evidence in the legislative history of section
691(c) to indicate that the deduction was not to be fully available
in all cases. 127 Several years later, the Court of Claims, in a factu-
ally similar case, Meissner v. United States,12 8 agreed with the
Fifth Circuit and held that a "taxpayer should be able to use the
deduction in the way most advantageous to him."'2
In 1972, Goodwin v. United States5 0 presented the converse
situation. In Goodwin, the taxpayer sought to use his 691(c) deduc-
tion to reduce ordinary income, even though the deduction had
originated in the inclusion of a capital gains item in the estate.'3'
In contrast to its position in Read, wherein it had asserted that the
691(c) deduction could only be used to offset ordinary income, the
Government in Goodwin maintained that the 691(c) deduction
120 Id. The Commissioner was relying on Weil v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir.
1956), wherein the use of a charitable deduction was disallowed as an offset to capital gains
because the taxpayer had calculated his tax by applying the alternative method. Id. at 595-
96. The Read court, however, distinguished Weil, stating that charitable deductions are not
the same as deductions designed to protect capital. 320 F.2d at 552. Moreover, the court
observed, the Sixth Circuit was reluctant to extend Weil and did allow capital charges to
stand as an offset to capital gains where the alternative method was used. Id. (citing United
States v. Memorial Corp., 244 F.2d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1957)).
12" 320 F.2d at 553. At the outset, the court noted that the purpose of section 691(c) is
to affect the estate tax paid on income in respect of a decedent and to normalize the income
tax consequences to the recipient. Id. This interpretation, it was posited, was supported by
the legislative history of the provision, wherein Congress announced that the intention of
section 691(c) was to offset any estate tax attributable to the inclusion of an item of IRD in
the gross estate. Id.; see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 87-89, reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4720-21; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65,
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4090-91. The Read court, constru-
ing section 691(c) as providing for a pro tanto cancellation of estate tax, concluded that the
Government's view was tantamount to double taxation in derogation of congressional intent.
320 F.2d at 553.
1- 364 F.2d 409 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
129 Id. at 413. The Meissner court reviewed the history of section 691(c) and concluded
that Congress desired to achieve "approximately the same tax consequences" as if the dece-
dent had acquired the tax liability before he died. Id. at 414 (emphasis in original). See also
Craven, Taxation of Income of Decedents, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 185, 187-94 (1953).
1-0 458 F.2d 108 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
131 Id. at 109.
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could only be used to offset capital gain.13 2 To support its new po-
sition, the Government asserted that the 691(c) deduction was
available solely to offset the recipient's increase in income tax
which resulted from the inclusion of IRD in his or her gross in-
come.133 Thus, the Government postulated, a deduction related to
an item of IRD generated by a capital gain could not be used to
offset unrelated ordinary income.3 The Court of Claims, however,
reaffirmed its view that the taxpayer may use the 691(c) deduction
in the manner most advantageous to him.
The question concerning the correct use of the 691(c) deduc-
tion next arose in United States v. Quick.136 The problem
presented in Quick can be illustrated by the following hypotheti-
cal. Assume that an estate has a $100 long term capital gain item
of IRD which was subject to an estate tax of $40. Accordingly, the
recipient of the $100 would be entitled to a 691(c) deduction of
$40. In the Government's view, the income tax due would be calcu-
lated by first reducing the capital gain by the 691(c) deduction of
$40, and thereafter, by applying the capital gains section 1202 de-
duction, which at the time was fifty percent, thus yielding a taxa-
ble amount of $30. The taxpayer, on the other hand, argued for a
calculation beginning with the 1202 deduction, thereby yielding a
taxable amount of $10.1"7
Adopting the "method most advantageous to the taxpayer,"
132 Id. The Government's "new" position was to limit 691(c) deductions to capital gains
as allowed by Read, and to disallow the deduction against ordinary income on the theory
that, in the majority of cases, this would benefit taxpayers, although the present taxpayer
would be penalized. Id. at 111. The court was wary of this turnabout and held for the tax-
payer. Id. at 112.
1 Id. at 108.
' Id. at 112. The Government was saved the embarrassment of reversing the position
taken in Read and Meissner since the capital gain in Goodwin had not been calculated
under the alternative method.
1-1 Id. at 111; accord, Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 886-87 (1976), acq.
1976-44 I.R.B. 5, aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977). In Sidles, the estate received a
corporation's liquidating assets as income in respect of a decedent. 65 T.C. at 882. The
recipients thereof elected to apply their section 691(c) deduction to reduce their ordinary
income to zero before reducing the amount of long term capital gains on which the alterna-
tive tax rate was applied. Id. at 883. The court was faced with the question whether the
section 691(c) deduction was limited to offset solely 691(a) items, or whether it could be
used to offset any income item whatsoever. Id. The court resolved the question in favor of
the recipients, holding that the estate tax deduction permitted by section 691(c) could be
used by the taxpayers to their greatest advantage. Id. at 887.
236 360 F. Supp. 568 (D. Colo. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1974).
137 The following table, compiled by two noted commentators, shows the tax effect of
the respective contentions of the parties:
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the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Quick held for the tax-
payer.13 8 Initially, the court observed that section 691(c) provided
that a deduction shall be allowed, but did not specifically state
"from what."1 9 In filling this void, the court reasoned that Con-
gress intended only to cut capital gain in half and had "not [in-
tended to] cut the deduction in half. ' 140 Thus, the court concluded
that the income against which the section 691(c) deduction was to
be applied was the statutory income,41 which, according to the hy-
Item of Income $158,090.00
Less: Section 1202 - $79,045.00
Less: Section 691(c) = 20,506.84 99,551.84
Net Taxable Gain $58,538.16
The Government upon audit recomputed the taxable gain as follows:
Item of Income $158,090.00
Less: Section 691(c) 20,506.84
Net Capital Gain $137,583.16
Less: Section 1202 68,791.58
Net Taxable Gain $68,791.58
Levey & Brogan, An Analysis of the Impact of Quick on Estate Planning Where There is
IRD, 42 J. TAx. 293, 295 (1975). Hence, the taxpayer would have lost more than $10,250
under the Government's computation.
503 F.2d 100, 102 (10th Cir. 1974).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. It was suggested that after Quick the government would need Congress' help to
succeed in delimiting the section 691(c) deduction. Levey & Brogan, supra note 137, at 295.
In the absence of congressional assistance, the "most advantageous principle" seems the
most equitable approach to taxpayer use of the deduction. Id. at 295; see Read v. United
States, 320 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1963); Meissner v. United States, 364 F.2d 409, 413-14
(Ct. Cl. 1966). Of course, the possible tax savings which could be obtained by directly offset-
ting capital gains with a section 691(c) deduction did not escape the eye of tax planners. See
Seltzer, Installment Sales in Contemplation of Death, 42 CPA J. 945, 945 (1972). If income
in respect of a decedent consists of unrealized long-term capital gain, the estate tax attribu-
table to the full gain is deductible, even though only 40% of the gain is subject to income
tax under section 1202. I.R.C. § 1202 (1981). Thus, if the estate tax bracket exceeds 40%, an
overall income tax saving will result. Only 40% of the long-term capital gain will be in-
cluded in income, but the estate tax deduction will be calculated on the full capital gain. For
example, an estate in the 55% estate tax bracket collects an installment obligation which
results in a $200 long-term gain. The gain would be reduced to $80 by the capital gain
deduction. Yet, the recipient would be entitled to a 691(c) deduction of $110 (55% of $200).
Cf. Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 893 (1976) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting)
(this approach "enables [taxpayers] to have their cake and eat it too"), acq. 1976-44 LR.B.
5, afl'd mem., 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977). Levey and Brogan use the following example to
note the distinct advantages for planning such treatment for large estates. Assume that an
elderly person, or one who has been informed that death is imminent, possesses assets with
a fair market value of $6 million. Included in the assets is a parcel of undeveloped real
estate which has a fair market value of $1 million and a basis of $100,000. The usual estate
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pothetical, would equal $100.
Having failed to close this loophole through judicial action, the
Treasury finally succeeded in having the Code amended to con-
form to its position in Quick. Section 702(b)(1) of the Revenue Act
of 1978,42 which added section 691(c)(4) to the Code, provides
that "the amount of any gain [included in 691(a)] . . .shall be
reduced... by the amount of the deduction allowable under para-
graph (1) of this subsection with respect to such item.' 43 Thus, in
essence, the 691(c) estate tax deduction attributable to an item of
capital gain must first reduce that gain before computation of the
capital gain deductions permitted under other provisions of the
Code.
144
plan for this piece of property would be to hold it until death because the property would,
then, receive the section 1014 stepped up basis. LR.C. § 1014 (1981). Thereafter, if the bene-
ficiaries sell the property, little or no capital gain would be realized. Consider, however, the
alternative of a lifetime sale of the property to another party for $1 million, payable by
$40,000 down and the remainder in installments of $16,000 a month for the succeeding 5-
year period. The seller would elect to recognize the gain under section 453-the installment
method of recognition. See I.R.C. § 453 (1980). Assume that the payee dies after receiving
the down payment and five monthly payments and that the installment note is the only
item of income in respect of a decedent included in his estate. In this posture, the recipient
would realize a net taxable capital loss of $69,120. Necessarily, this loss represents a correla-
tive underutilization of the section 691(c) deduction. Thus, the taxpayer, under the "most
advantageous" principle of Quick, has available a deduction of $69,120 which may be used
to offset ordinary income. See Read v. United States, 320 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1963).
142 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(b)(1), 92 Stat. 2925 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 691(c)(4) (Supp. II 1979)). This enactment, which added section 691(c)(4) to the
Code, became effective on November 6, 1978. For an analysis of the Revenue Act of 1978
and its effect on income in respect of a decedent generally, see Klein, supra note 4, at 377-
79.
1LR.C. § 691(c)(4) (1978). Section 691(c)(4) was originally introduced by a House of
Representatives bill entitled the Technical Corrections Act of 1977, the purpose of which
was to correct technical errors in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. See Technical Corrections
Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 6715 Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1977). The problem sought to be resolved was created by the enactment of the
carryover basis rule. Id. See generally Klein, supra note 4.
144 Although the enactment of section 691(c)(4) appears to settle the issue, a cautionary
note should be sounded because the 1978 amendment was intimately related to the carry-
over basis provisions of the 1976 Tax Reform Act. U.S. CoNGoss JOINT CoMMrrzE ON TAX-
ATION, GESERAL EXPLANATION OF REvENuE ACT OF 1978, 409 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
JOINT COMMITTEE BLUEBOOK]. Under the carryover basis provisions, the basis of property
acquired from the decedent dying after December 31, 1976 was to be "carried over" to the
estate or beneficiary for the purpose of determining a gain or loss on the disposition of the
property. I.R.C. § 1023 (repealed by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 299 (1980)). Heirs were permitted a basis adjustment for federal
and state death taxes which were attributable to appreciation. Id. This adjustment was con-
sidered to be analogous to the section 691(c) deduction permitted recipients of IRD. JOINT
CoMMrrrEE BLUEBOOK, supra, at 409. Experience, however, proved otherwise. Indeed, as
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THE ULTIMATE REFORM: REPEAL
The Whimsical Nature of Section 691
Permeating the discussion of the effect of the section 691(c)
deduction on the sale of capital assets is the fact that the ultimate
value of this deduction depends upon the income tax bracket of
the recipient of the IRD item. The recipient's tax rate, however,
bears no relation to the decedent's tax rate. Thus, the whimsical
nature of the current tax scheme is apparent, for the income tax
rate at which an item of income in respect of a decedent is re-
turned has absolutely no connection with the decedent's tax rate.
Indeed, given the capacity of an executor to distribute an item of
income in respect of a decedent to one of several beneficiaries, the
present system, in effect, amounts to something akin to fiscal
roulette. 14 5
noted by the Joint Committee:
In the case of a sale before death, some courts have held that an individual is
entitled to both the deduction for estate taxes attributable to the gain and the
long-term capital gain deduction based on the amount of gain undiminished by
the deduction for estate taxes. However, in the case of a sale of inherited property
by an heir, the basis adjustments for death taxes attributable to appreciation
would be taken into account in determining the amount of gain to which the long-
term capital gain deduction applies.
Id. (footnote omitted). Congress, believing that the dichotomy in treatment was unjust, en-
acted section 691(c)(4) in order to rectify the discrimination against the sale of inherited
property. See Technical Corrections Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 6715 Before the Comm.
on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). With the demise of the carryover basis
rule, however, the injustice has disappeared. Presently, gains realized by heirs upon the sale
of inherited property are treated more favorably than gains recognized by the recipients of
IRD. See generally JoiNT CoMm1rrEE BLUEBOOK, supra, at 409.
'45 See generally M. FERGUSON, J. FREEAm & R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, at 296-97.
This fantasy treatment is compounded when one considers the section 691(c) deduction
which, in theory, is designed to compensate for the inclusion of the gross item of income in
respect of a decedent in the estate tax retuin. Optimally, of course, it would be desirable to
reduce the gross estate by the amount of income tax that the decedent would have paid had
he received the item of income in respect of a decedent while alive. See Klein, supra note 4,
at 304. This cannot be done, however, because one cannot reasonably guess the tax treat-
ment the item would have been accorded in the decedent's hands. Instead, the item of in-
come in respect of a decedent is reduced by section 691(b) deductions in respect of a dece-
dent. See I.R.C. § 691(b) (allowing deductions under sections 162, 163, 164, 212, and 611).
The resulting net income in respect of a decedent is the foundation upon which the section
691(c) deduction is computed. Nonetheless, this formula ignores the premise of section 691
which is to minimize the effect of death. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, 83
(1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1942). Indeed, "if the decedent had paid
section 691(b) deductions during his life, his gross estate would have been proportionately
smaller and hence no net effect on his taxable estate would have been discernible." Fergu-
son, supra note 3, at 149. Additionally, the netting requirement is unsatisfactory insofar as
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It is submitted that, instead of a randomly selected income tax
rate and an equally arbitrary section 691(c) deduction, a better ap-
proach might be to apply a flat income tax rate of twenty or thirty
percent on all items of income in respect of a decedent. This
amount would be paid by the executor and deducted prior to the
inclusion of the item in the gross estate. Surely, one objection to
this simple system is that a flat rate would favor wealthy taxpay-
ers. Accordingly, rather than instigate a new layer of encrusta-
tion-a graduated rate schedule for income in respect of a dece-
dent-it is suggested that the concept of income in respect of a
decedent, and section 691, should be abolished altogether. The re-
sult of this proposal would be to free items of income in respect of
a decedent from income taxation and to subject them to estate tax
at gross amounts. Clearly, neither the history of section 691146 nor
the inscrutable revenue effect of such a proposal would seem to be
substantial barriers to its acceptance. 147
A Call for Repeal
Presently, section 691 reinforces the "lock-in" effect of section
1014(a)'s step-up in basis. 48 Indeed, it is clear to every tax planner
that the best course for the elderly client who desires to "sell-out"
of the family business is to hold the asset until death so as to take
advantage of section 1014(a). Even if the client were willing to
forego the advantages of the step-up in basis, the risk that death
might ensue during the course of the transaction militates against
the recipient of income in respect of a decedent is not necessarily the party who receives the
benefit of the section 691(b) deductions. Id. at 149-50. As a result, the available section
691(c) deduction may be unjustifiably reduced. See id. at 148-51; M. FERGUSON, J. FRAELAND
& R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, at 286-88.
1" See notes 6-14 and accompanying text supra. The purpose of the statutory prede-
cessors of section 691 was to rectify the disparity between accrual and cash basis taxpayers.
See M. FERGUSON, J. FRELAND & R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, at 140. In reality, however,
such disparity may have been more apparent than real. Interestingly, in this regard, the
Internal Revenue Service does not record how many taxpayers keep their books on an ac-
crual basis. Moreover, there is no evidence that Congress, in enacting its initial remedial
provision, see Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 694, engaged in an empirical study
pertaining to the perceived differential tax results of death on cash and accrual basis tax-
payers. See S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934), reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. (pt. 2)
586, 608. Hence, it is conceivable that the alleged discrimination between cash and accrual
basis taxpayers is actually at a de minimis level and does not rationally support the section
691 superstructure.
147 See generally notes 151-180 and accompanying text infra.
"' See note 25 supra. For a discussion of the interaction between I.R.C. section 691
and section 1014, see M. FERGUSON, J. FsEELAND, & R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, at 177-84.
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an inter vivos disposition. Thus, from a policy point of view, if
sales are to be encouraged during the seller's lifetime, the concept
of income in respect of a decedent should be abandoned.
Additionally, in the context of sales of capital goods, dispens-
ing with section 691 treatment would remove the unfairness engen-
dered by the provision. Notably, the incidence of income in respect
of a decedent arises only when the cash basis taxpayer has had the
misfortune to die before receiving the proceeds of an otherwise
completed transaction. Because such taxpayer has been deprived
of the enjoyment of the proceeds and has eschewed the tax advan-
tages of section 1014(a), it appears fitting not to impose an addi-
tional tax burden.149
Finally, repeal of section 691 would eliminate the substantial
compliance costs associated with identifying items of income in re-
spect of a decedent-a consideration receiving increasing recogni-
tion in tax literature. Every estate, no matter how small, may, and
most likely does, contain several items of income in respect of a
decedent. The most common items, one would surmise, are post-
mortem receipts of earned income and accrued interest. In each of
these situations, the executor or administrator must isolate the
item and inform the beneficiary that, unlike other distributions
which are income tax free, the IRD item must be included in the
beneficiary's income tax return. Clearly, the location, identifica-
tion, and separate distribution of items of income in respect of a
decedent must, by necessity, increase administrative expenses and
will involve some cost to estate beneficiaries. Considering the mul-
titude of diminutive payments of income in respect of a decedent
which enter small estates, compliance costs may outweigh the reve-
nue effects of section 691. Parenthetically, if it is assumed that
compliance costs are de minimis because small estates are inexpen-
sively administered, the corollary might be a failure to identify and
report items of income in respect of a decedent, thereby frustrating
the revenue purpose of section 691.180
"I For a series of calculations illustrating how the section 691(c) deduction can vary
depending upon the marital deduction provision of a will or trust, see A. J. CASNER, ESTATE
PLANNING 82 (Supp. 1981).
150 Income in respect of a decedent, to the extent that it is reported at all, is reported
on either Form 1040 or Form 1041, neither of which contains a separate line for the item.
Hence, one's ability to ascertain the revenues generated by section 691 is complicated. In-
deed, even information on the dollar volume of IRD reported on estate income tax returns
cannot be obtained because the Internal Revenue Service does not compile such data. Letter
from William J. Smith, Jr., Acting Chief, Statistics of Income Branch II, Internal Revenue
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In sum, section 691 theoretically is unsound, inherently unfair,
onerous in view of the compliance costs, and antithetic to the pol-
icy espoused in section 1014(a). For these reasons, Congress should
critically examine the concept of income in respect of a decedent
with a view toward repeal. In any event, an empirical study should
be conducted to determine the effectiveness of section 691 as a rev-
enue source and as a remedial provision against perceived discrimi-
nation. Indeed, as will be discussed below, such an examination
will yield the conclusion that the effect of repeal on revenues
would be marginal.
The Revenue Effect of Repeal
Although data is lacking with which one may precisely predict
the outcome of the present proposal with respect to taxable
estates, several estimates, based upon the data available in the
Service, to Gilbert P. Verbit (April 10, 1980). The only available information is the volume
of section 691(c) deductions. See hNrNLu RavEmu SmwVicE, DFP'T OF THE TREASURY, STA-
TIsTcs oF INcoME 1974: FmucIARY INcoME TAX RETuRNs 17-23 (1977). Of a total of 336,475
estate income tax returns filed in 1974, 20,474 took a total of $41,521,000 in section 691(c)
deductions. Id. at 20. Most of these deductions were taken by estates with income of greater
than $7,000:
No. of Estates Amount
$7,000 - 10,000 2536 $1,566,000
10,000 - 15,000 2762 2,576,000
15,000 - 25,000 2974 4,498,000
25,000 - 50,000 2601 8,158,000
50,000 - 100,000 1411 8,036,000
100,000 - 200,000 488 4,427,000
200,000 - 500,000 190 3,997,000
500,000 - 1,000,000 37 1,086,000
1,000,000 - or more 16 2,691,000
Id. Additionally, in 1974, a total of 4,916 trusts reported a total of $11,513,000 in section
691(c) deductions. Of this total, the vast majority were reported by taxable trusts reporting
income in excess of $10,000:
No. of Trusts Amount
$10,000 - 15,000 489 $510,000
15,000 - 25,000 774 925,000
25,000 - 50,000 604 1,720,000
50,000 - 100,000 269 1,669,000
100,000 - 200,000 94 1,034,000
200,000 - 500,000 45 1,108,000
500,000 - or more 4 1,994,000
Id. at 27.
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cases, may be constructed. Sun First National Bank v. United
States151 provides an interesting starting point. In Sun First Na-
tional Bank, the value of the trust assets included in the dece-
dent's estate was $4,853,196.152 On this amount, the Commis-
sioner assessed an estate tax of $3,070,532.158 Accordingly, the de-
cedent's daughter, the ultimate recipient of the IRD, received a
section 691(c) credit of $3,070,532 on a capital gain of
$4,842,196.15 Pursuant to section 691(c)(4), the 691(c) credit must
be deducted from the amount of the gain before taking the capital
gains deduction.1 5  Thus, the calculation would be $4,842,196 -
$3,070,532 = $1,771,664. The gain, reduced by the section 1202
deduction, would be $1,771,664 - $1,062,998 = $708,666. Assum-
ing the new maximum income tax rate of fifty percent, the total
tax due would be $354,333.16 Should section 691 be repealed, this
amount would not be paid and would thus be a revenue loss to the
Treasury and a gain to the taxpayer. But would it be a windfall? If
the purpose of section 691 is to tax the gain as if it had been re-
ceived by the decedent while alive, the answer would be no be-
cause, had the decedent completed the sale and received full pay-
151 607 F.2d 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1979), withdrawing and replacing 587 F.2d 1073 (Ct. Cl.
1978). In Sun First Nat'l Bank, the grantor-decedent was the beneficiary of a trust which,
prior to her death, sold a portion of the corpus for a downpayment in cash and 15 promis-
sory notes payable annually. 607 F.2d at 1349. The decedent's successor in interest at-
tempted to claim the benefit of the section 691(c) deduction. The Court of Claims, after
initially ruling to the contrary, held that if a grantor trust makes an installment sale prior to
the grantor's death, the income from the receipt of the installments made after death con-
stitutes IRD. Id. at 1354-55. While the case illustrates the problems courts have had in
interpreting IRD, it also may be viewed as a potential impediment to the continued use of
the inter vivos revocable trust in estate planning. The interpretative gymnastics manifested
by the Court of Claims in its two opinions and the potential loss of the section 691(c) deduc-
tion may give pause to any tax planner thinking of using the revocable trust as a tax plan-
ning device. For a critique of the withdrawn opinion, see Bellows, Grantor Trusts: Court of
Claims Founders in Its Attempt to Navigate in Murky Income in Respect of a Decedent
Waters, 3 Rav. TAX. INDMvDUALS 344, 344-49 (1979).
"2 Estate of Andersen v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1164, 1164-66 (1973). The
parties stipulated that the fair market value of the assets in trust at the date of the settlor's
death was $4,853,196. Id. at 1166. See generally Cleary, Revision in Deductions for IRD
Items Create New Planning Possibilities, 53 J. TAX. 70, 72 (1980); Klein, supra note 4, at
377-78.
32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1164.
15 607 F.2d at 1349.
See notes 142-144 and accompanying text supra.
The computation for determining tax due is: Total Gain ($4,842,196) - 691(c) de-
duction ($3,070,532) = $1,771,664. The section 1202 deduction, 60% of $1,771,664, is
$1,062,998, leaving a taxable gain of $708,666. Thus, the tax liability, assuming a 50% tax
rate, is $354,333.
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ment while alive, the maximum tax on her long-term gain would
have been $1,355,815. Moreover, the tax payment would have re-
duced her estate by an equal amount. 157
Although we do not know the total value of the decedent's es-
tate, we do know that the inclusion of the stock valued at
$4,853,196 resulted in an additional tax of $3,070,532.151 Given the
rate schedule in force prior to 1976,159 the total taxable estate
would have amounted to approximately $8,500,000. Even under the
decreased maximum estate tax rate of fifty percent, not scheduled
to take effect until 1986, the estate tax due would have decreased
by $677,908 due to the elimination of $1,355,815 from an estate of
$8,500,000. Thus, the $354,333 loss in income taxes to the Treasury
would have been more than offset by the additional estate tax
which the estate would have had to pay.16 0 Therefore, if a windfall
occurred as a result of the death of the taxpayer before the com-
pletion of the sale, that windfall is garnered by the Treasury, not
the taxpayer.
The Treasury would suffer a loss, however, if these same as-
sumptions are applied to other cases from which data can be
drawn. In Meissner v. United States,16 1 for example, the item of
income in respect of a decedent was included in an estate valued at
$4,200,000.162 The item constituted almost half of the gross es-
tate.16 3 Premised on the assumption that the item represented all
gain, its predeath sale would attract a long-term capital gains tax
of roughly $420,000. On the simplifying assumption that the item
57 See Chastain v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 461, 465-66 (1972).
I" See 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1164.
2" Prior to 1976, if the taxable estate was over $8 million but not greater than $10
million, the tax was $4,568,200, plus 76% of the excess over $8 million. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, ch. 11, § 2001, 68A Stat. 373 (current version at I.R.C. § 2001 (1978)).
26 Tax receipts from the income transaction vary depending upon three hypotheses:
(1) If Jeanette Andersen had lived, she would have paid an income tax of $1,355,815,
but her ultimate estate tax burden would have been reduced by $677,908 because the
amount of income tax paid would have been eliminated from her gross estate. Thus, the
total federal tax burden of the transaction is $677,908.
(2) Under the facts as they exist, the inclusion of the IRD amounts results in the An-
dersen estate paying $677,908 more in estate tax, while the remainderman, Mrs. Andersen's
daughter, pays an income tax of $354,333 when she receives the payments. In this situation,
the Treasury collects $1,032,241.
(3) Under the proposal in the text, the Treasury would collect the $677,908 in addi-
tional estate tax, but no income tax. Thus, the total revenue collection is $677,908.
'" 364 F.2d 409 (Ct. CL 1966).
See id. at 410 & n.2.
113 See id. at 410.
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was in fact one half of a gross estate, the present treatment of in-
come in respect of a decedent reduced the estate tax by approxi-
mately $263,000. Thus, under the proposal, the Treasury would
collect an added $263,000 in estate taxes and lose long term capital
gains taxes of approximately $420,000. Note, however, that this
loss of income tax is premised upon the ultimate recipient's having
to pay tax at the maximum income tax rate of fifty percent. If,
instead, the recipient paid tax at a thirty percent rate, the Trea-
sury would collect only $252,000 in income tax, as against an addi-
tional estate tax collection of $263,000.13(
Notwithstanding the fact that one cannot accurately predict
the recipient's tax rate, the varying tax situations of recipients are
a recognized item of postmortem estate planning, a cardinal tenet
of which is to distribute items of income in respect of a decedent
to low bracket taxpayers. Thus, it can safely be assumed that items
of income in respect of a decedent will not be taxed at the maxi-
mum rate of fifty percent. The net revenue loss to the Treasury, if
any, would rarely approximate that which would have occurred in
the above example.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which the Treasury
clearly will lose revenue. In Sidles, for example, the item of income
in respect of a decedent had a basis of $29,710, was valued at
$702,830, and generated a section 691(c) deduction of $94,448.165
These figures would indicate that the taxable estate was slightly in
excess of $800,000. If the sale of the stock had been completed
before death, there would have been a taxable gain of $673,129 on
which a tax of $134,626 would be assessed, assuming a sixty per-
cent capital gains deduction and a fifty percent tax rate."8 6 Reduc-
ing Sidles' estimated estate by this amount, assuming a $600,000
exemption equivalent, would decrease his estate taxes by approxi-
mately $40,000, and the item's recipient would pay $134,626 in tax.
Again, this assumes a recipient tax rate of fifty percent. In Sidles,
the recipient would have to pay an effective rate below twenty per-
cent for the Treasury not to lose under the present proposal. Here,
16 See Drye, supra note 18, at 213. The ultimate tax burden may be reduced further by
averaging section 691 income. See Rev. Rul. 467, 1970-2 C.B. 169.
161 Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 873, 876-77 (1976), acq. 1976-44 LR.B. 5,
aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
16 The computation of tax liability would be: Total Gain ($673,129) - 60% of Total
Gain ($403,877) = Taxable Gain ($269,252). Assuming a 50% rate, the tax liability is
$134,476.
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then, the Treasury loss is based not upon the assumption of a high
recipient tax rate, but rather upon a low estate tax bracket.
It is clear, therefore, that the Treasury will lose revenue when
items of income in respect of a decedent are not subject to estate
tax and that the loss will decrease as the taxable estate and the
estate tax paid increase. At the highest levels, however, the Trea-
sury clearly collects more from section 691 treatment than it would
collect had the decedent paid income tax on the item of IRD
before death.1 7 A comparison of the estimated results of the pro-
posed elimination of section 691 to the system as it presently exists
indicates that the section 691(c) deduction plays an important role
in the total tax picture. Whenever the estate tax rate exceeds the
recipient's income tax rate, the deduction effectively eliminates in-
come tax payment by the recipient. The major effect of the pro-
posed change, therefore, will be to reduce the taxes paid by the
recipients of items of income in respect of a decedent arising from
small and medium sized estates while keeping tax collection from
large estates at approximately the same level.
The revenue loss, however, would be greater if the items of
income in respect of a decedent represented ordinary income
rather than capital gain, because the former is subject to higher
levels of taxation. 8 Nevertheless, for the classic item-earned but
unpaid salary-the loss of federal revenue should not loom large.169
Indeed, the principal area of concern would be the loss of tax re-
ceipts on the post mortem realization of large amounts of deferred
compensation or retirement benefits.1 70
The treatment of retirement benefits is extremely complex
and one can only hope that any summary will not be misleading.
Benefits received from a nonqualified deferred compensation ar-
rangement clearly would constitute income in respect of a dece-
167 It should be noted that, under the present scheme, an executor may effectively as-
sure the nonincome taxability of an item by distributing such to a tax exempt entity. See M.
FERGUSON, J. FRLAAND & R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, at 371; 3 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX
TECHNIQUES 1935 (1981).
168 Compare LR.C. § 1 (1978) with I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1978).
2" Earned but unpaid salary has often been described as "the most obvious example of
income in respect of a decedent." Ferguson, supra note 3, at 28. It is probable, however, that
such items of income in respect of a decedent will be insignificant, and therefore, any fed-
eral revenue loss will be negligible. See J. LASSER, supra note 167, at 1935. On the contrary,
significant revenues may be lost when the items include income from installment obliga-
tions, partnership income, executory contracts, and the like. Id.
170 See M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, at 162-77 (application
of section 691 to various forms of deferred income and death benefits).
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dent.171 Recognizing this, however, tax planners presently advise
clients to name their children or grandchildren the beneficiaries of
such arrangements, thereby minimizing the tax effect of death172
because the payments received after death are excluded from the
taxable estate and are only subject to income tax at the benefi-
ciary's rate. If, on the other hand, section 691 is repealed, the ben-
eficiaries would receive the payments free of income tax. The gov-
ernment, however, will not sustain a significant revenue loss
because the payments would be subject to estate taxes.173
In the context of a qualified plan,174 an employee may receive
his benefits in the form of an annuity or in a lump sum. A question
has arisen as to whether receipts from the qualified plan in an an-
nuity ever constitute income in respect of a decedent. The issue
concerns the preemptive effect of section 72 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, which deals with the taxation of annuities.17 5 If annuity
distributions from qualified plans are taxable under section 72,
they would not be affected by the present proposal. Moreover, an-
nuity distributions from qualified plans are largely excluded from
the gross estate, thus precluding application of section 691.176 The
alternative form of distribution from a qualified plan is a lump
sum. Although a lump sum is included in the taxable estate and
treated as ordinary income, the recipient, pursuant to section
402(e)(1)(c), may elect the benefits of the special 10-year forward
income averaging method.17 7 It is significant to note that the 10-
171 See Rev. Rul. 31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178-81; cf. Latendresse v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
318, 328 (1956), affd, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1957) (renewal commissions earned by decedent
but not payable at time of death are items of income in respect of a decedent to recipient).
1 E.g., Estate Planning for the Corporate Executive, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 22s-3rd,
at A-16 (1979).
1'3 See notes 166-167 and accompanying text supra.
174 A qualified plan, which is tax exempt under I.R.C. § 501(a), is an employees' trust
created by an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries. See
I.R.C. § 402(a) (1980).
15 Hess v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 104, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1959) (annuity payments from
qualified plans are income in respect of decedents). But see Lacomble v. United States, 177
F. Supp. 373, 375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (joint and survivor annuity distributions are taxable
income under section 72 and not income in respect of a decedent under section 691). Section
691(d)(1), however, specifically gives a section 691(c) deduction to survivor receipts to the
extent that the annuity value is included in the taxable estate under section 72. See I.R.C. §
691(c) (1981).
17 I.R.C. § 2039(c) (1978). This section excludes from the gross estate the value of cer-
tain annuities. Id. Section 1.691(a)-l(d) of the Regulations provide that any item excluded
from gross income is not IRD. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(d) (1960).
177 I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)(c) (1978).
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year averaging period was chosen by Congress because it repre-
sents the approximate life expectancy of a 65-year-old person .17
Thus, Congress did not expect that lump-sum retirement benefits
would be received after death. Moreover, the additional tax assess-
ment for the 10-year period is calculated in the year the lump-sum
payment is received.19M Accordingly, section 691 treatment is not
necessary in such a case, for subsections (a) and (c) of section 691
were devised to compensate for that situation wherein the income
tax which the decedent would have paid had he received the item
while alive could not be accurately calculated. Because the section
402(e)(1) election provides a way in which to calculate the tax that
the decedent would have paid had he received the distribution, the
section 691 fiction need not be used.
Necessarily, therefore, the problem of income in respect of a
decedent can only arise if the lump sum is distributed after the
death of the person who earned it. Until 1976, a postmortem lump-
sum distribution from a qualified plan was not included in the
gross estate, and thus section 691 did not apply. When the Code
was amended in 1976 to include lump-sum distributions in the tax-
able estate, the change also made these distributions subject to
section 691 treatment. The revenue effects of this change, however,
are not as clear as expected, for in some circumstances, the section
691(c) deduction generated by including the lump-sum distribution
in the estate may exceed the income tax payable by the recipient.
This would be true if the taxable estate was large and the distribu-
tion small. In contrast, the benefits of the section 691(c) deduction
may be lost to the low income recipient because section 402(e)(3)
indicates that lump-sum distributions are not included in the tax-
payer's adjusted gross income. This means that the section 691(c)
deduction can only be used to offset other income, which income
may not be sufficient to permit optional use of the deduction.'80
278 H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 392.
179 See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.402(e)(2)(b)(4), reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 18,798,
18,802 (1975). For a discussion of the rules concerning lump-sum distributions, see M. FA-
GUSON, J. FREANx D & R. STEPHENS, supra note 17, at 174-75.
180 See Cleary, supra note 152, at 73. Lump-sum distributions from a qualified pension
or profit-sharing plan are a source of income subject to favorable income taxation treatment.
Recently, such proceeds became includible in the estate for estate tax purposes. Distribu-
tions that are not lump sum, while not included in the estate for estate tax purposes, are
subject to income tax. Hence, there is a resultant trade-off. Id.; see A. J. CAsNER, ESTATE
PLANNING 367-418 (4th ed. 1979); Kochis, How to Handle Distributions From Employee
Benefit Plans, 117 TRs. & ESTS. 476 (1978); Nasuti, How to Coordinate Income and Estate
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Thus, the revenue impact of removing retirement benefits from
section 691 treatment is far from clear. What is clear is that the
carefully developed rules for the income taxation of retirement
benefits become inapplicable and are replaced by the cumbersome
system of income in respect of a decedent when the retiree dies
before the actuaries expected.
CONCLUSION
Upon review of section 691, its legislative history, and several
of the provision's significant problems, it is apparent that, in the
absence of either a uniform judicial interpretation or an adequate
legislative response, the concept of income in respect of a decedent
will continue to be particularly troublesome in the context of capi-
tal sales transactions. Pending congressional action, the courts may
mitigate the difficulties by unambiguously defining the term "right
to income." It is suggested that IRD should result only when the
decedent had closed the transaction during his lifetime, or if in-
complete, only when the decedent held out the asset for sale in the
ordinary course of his business. Nevertheless, Congress should ulti-
mately confront the problems that it has created by enacting sec-
tion 691. In so doing, repeal would be the appropriate response. If,
however, the concept of income in respect of a decedent is to be
perpetuated, Congress, at the very least, should define the ambit of
section 691(a) and should restore vitality to section 691(c).
Tax Planning for Qualified Plan Distributions, 49 J. TAx. 194, 195 (1978).
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